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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BIOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS
AND INTENT V. WAIVER IN ESTABLISHING PROTECTED
PARENTAL RIGHTS
D.M . . T.M.H., 129 SO. 3D 320 (FLA. 2013)
Susan M Johns*
The biological mother who donated her egg to her former lesbian
partner so her partner could undergo in vitro fertilization and the two
could raise the resulting child together sought to establish her parental
rights to the child.' The biological mother brought suit in the Circuit
Court, Brevard County. 2 The trial court applied section 742.14, Florida's
assisted reproductive technology statute, and held the biological mother
was an egg donor and had no parental rights to the child.' The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the birth mother and the biological
mother appealed.' The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed concluding
* B.A. in Psychology, Phi Beta Kappa, Magna cum laude, College of William & Mary,
2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2016. The Author would like
to thank her family for their love and support.
1. D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 327 (Fla. 2013). The women, at the time involved
in a long-term committed relationship, "agreed to jointly conceive and raise a child together as
equal parental partners." Id. When the child was bom, she was given a hyphenation of the
women's last names. Id. Both women were actively involved in the child's baptism and early
education. Id at 329 (citing T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 788-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)).
However, once the relationship between the women deteriorated, the birth mother absconded with

the child and alleged she alone had the fundamental right to be the child's parent. Id. at 330. The
birth mother based part of her argument on the fact that the biological mother had signed a
standard informed consent waiving her rights to the child. Id. at 344-45.
2. See id at 330 (citing T.MH., 79 So. 3d at 798 n.1).
3.

FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2014).
The donor of any egg, sperm, or preembryo, other than the commissioning couple
or a father who has executed a preplanned adoption agreement under s. 63.212,

shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights and obligations with respect to the
donation of the resulting children. Only reasonable compensation directly related
to the donation of eggs, sperm, and pre-embryos shall be permitted.
Id. In applying the statute, the trial court found that the women, as a same sex couple, could not
meet the definition of a "commissioning couple" for the biological mother to be exempt from the
relinquishment of her parental rights. DM T., 129 So. 3d at 330. A "commissioning couple" is
"the intended mother and father of a child who will be conceived by means of assisted
reproductive technology using the eggs or sperm of at least one of the intended parents." FLA.
STAT. § 742.13 (2014).
4. D.MT., 129 So. 3d at 330.
5. Id. at 330-31.
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section 742.14 unconstitutionally violated the biological mother's
protected rights.6 The instant court had mandatory jurisdiction to review
this case under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution,
because in reaching its decision, the Fifth District declared section 742.14
unconstitutional as applied to the biological mother.7 HELD, biological
mother's due process rights were violated by requiring her to relinquish
her parental rights where she was an intended biological parent and
established a parental relationship with the child, and as the biological
and intended parent, she did not waive her rights by signing an informed
consent for the in vitro fertilization procedure.8
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that parents have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and upbringing of
their children. 9 However this is not an absolute right.' 0 In fact, children
may be removed from their biological parents without the parents'
consent to removal." In deciding whether to remove a child from a
parent, courts have analyzed parent-child relationships and the intent of
the parties.' 2
In In re Adoption of Baby E.A. W, the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed a lower court's holding that consent was not required of a
biological father before his child was placed for adoption.1 3 In Baby
E.A. W, the biological father failed to provide emotional or financial
support to the birth mother and unborn child during the pregnancy.14
According to the Supreme Court of Florida, this lack of emotional or
financial support for the mother and child evinced the biological father's
abandonment of the unborn child.' 5 The court held that where a biological
father abandons his child, his consent is not required in an adoption
proceeding.16
The court in Baby E.A. W reiterated that the natural parent does have
a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of
his or her children but explained that this interest is not absolute.' 7
Specifically, the court noted a historical difference in the protection of
married fathers' versus unwed fathers' due process rights, implying that
6. Id. at 331.
7. Id. at 327.
8. Id. at 328, 347.
9. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 966 (Fla. 1995) (citing Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
10.
11.

Id.
See id. at 967.

12. See id. See also Janssen v. Alicea, 30 So. 3d 680, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
13. Baby E.A. W, 658 So. 2d at 967.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 966 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
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a biological link does not necessarily provide for constitutional protection
of parental rights.18 In fact, due process protection of these parental rights
will only attach once an unwed father has demonstrated "a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to
19
participate in raising his child." Thus, in determining that the biological
father was not denied his constitutional rights when his child was placed
for adoption without his consent, the court considered factors outside the
20
genetic relationship between parent and child.
In cases involving children conceived via assisted reproductive
technologies, courts have placed emphasis on the intent of the parties in
determining whether biological parents should be granted parental
rights. 2 1 For example, the Third District Court of Appeal in Janssen v.
Alicea held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a
biological mother and father intended to raise a child conceived through
artificial insemination together or whether the father was merely a sperm
donor. 2 2 This issue precluded the trial court's summary judgment in favor
23
of the mother in the father's action to establish his paternity.
In Janssen, close friends agreed to conceive a child through artificial
insemination whereby the father donated the sperm and the mother gave
with
birth to the baby. 24 After a couple of years, the mother moved away
25 Both
paternity.
his
establish
to
action
an
filed
father
the
and
child
the
parties contested the father's status under section 742.14.26 The father
alleged he was actively involved in the pregnancy and early years of the
child's life, that he and the mother planned to act as the child's parents
27
together, and as a result, he was part of a commissioning couple.
Conversely, the mother alleged that the father was only asked to be a
28
sperm donor and was not part of a commissioning couple.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the mother,
finding section 742.14 barred the paternity claim because the father was
a sperm donor, and the father and mother were not a commissioning
couple. 29 Finding there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the parties were in fact a commissioning couple, the Third District
18.

Id

19. Id.
20. See id at 967.
21. See Janssen v. Alicea, 30 So. 3d 680, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
22. Id at 681.
23. Id.
24. Id
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The biological father argued that because he was part of a "commissioning couple,"
section 742.14 did not bar his paternity claim. See FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2014).
28. Janssen, 30 So. 3d at 681.
29. Id.
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reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.3 0 In remanding the
case, the Third District Court of Appeal essentially asked the trial court
to look at the actions of the parties to determine their intent. In doing
so, the court not only permitted, but also requested, that intent be
considered when determining whether an individual has a parental
interest.32
However, intent to parent, or a so-called psychological parent
relationship, may not be enough to establish a protected parental interest
where a party has no biological connection to the child.3 3 In Wakeman v.
Dixon, a woman sued her former lesbian partner to enforce sperm
donation and co-parenting agreements.34 The two women entered into a
sperm donation agreement whereby both women were described as a
"recipient," "mother," and "co-parent." 35 Following the births
of each of
the two children, the birth mother entered into co-parenting agreements
with her partner. 36 However, after the relationship between the women
deteriorated, the birth mother moved away with the children and her
former partner sought to establish her parental rights.3 7 The First District
Court of Appeal held that the agreements were unenforceable as they
purported to grant parental rights to a third party.3 8
In reaching its decision, the court refused to recognize the rights of
psychological parents. 39 As such, psychological parents, despite their
intent to parent and formation of a relationship with the child, are not
entitled to custody or visitation.4 0 Such rights would interfere with the
biological or natural parent's liberty interest in parenting his or her
child. 4 1Thus, the courts may ignore agreements and waivers that purport
to represent the intent of at least one party if that party has no biological
relationship with the child at issue. 2 Although intent is an important
factor in establishing parental interests, a biological relationship is
30. Id. at 682.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
34. Id at 671.
35. Id at 670.
36. Id. The co-parenting agreements for each child were identical.
Id In the agreements,
the women indicated they would "equally share in providing [for] the child." Id.
Further, the
parties agreed to continue providing for the children in that manner even if the women
separated.
Id. The birth mother also named her former partner as the guardian of the children
and granted
her the authority to make medical and dental decisions for the children. Id.
37. Id. at 671.
38. Id. at 673.
39. Id.
40.

Id. The court cites a number of Florida cases as evidence of courts' refusal
to extend

visitation rights to so-called psychological parents.
41. Id. at 671.
42. Id. at 673.
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crucial.43

The instant court affirmed previously controlling law by declaring the
biological relationship between a parent and child and intent of an
individual to be a parent as the two most important factors respectively
in establishing a right to parent a child.44 The instant court emphasized
the biological mother's uncontroverted biological relationship to the
child when it held she had a protected fundamental right to be a parent to
46
that the
her child.4 5 Unlike the Wakeman court, the instant court opined
4 7 As the
former partner in the instant case was a biological parent.
biological parent she had a fundamental liberty interest to parent 4 her
8
child, and the application of section 742.14 violated her due process.
Moreover, in declaring that the application of section 742.14 as a bar
to the biological mother's assertion of parental rights was
unconstitutional, 49 the instant court borrowed the rule of Baby E.A. W. that
unwed fathers' inchoate interest in their biological children develops into
a protected interest once they have demonstrated a commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood.o In effect, the instant court declared that
a lesbian woman who donates her ova to her partner undergoing in vitro
fertilization could have an inchoate interest in the resulting children, just
51
as unwed fathers have an inchoate interest in their children.
Having determined that the biological mother had an inchoate interest
in the child, the court then looked to her intent and actions to determine
52
whether she had accepted responsibility for the child. If she had, her
inchoate interest would develop into a protected fundamental right to be
a parent to her child. The instant court found that the biological mother
assumed parental responsibilities. 54 The women used funds from their
55
joint bank account to pay for the in vitro fertilization procedure. Thus,
unlike the unwed father in Baby E.A. W, the biological mother in the
instant case provided financial support. 56 The women also sought
counseling together to prepare them both for parenthood, indicating the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 347 (Fla. 2013).
Id. at 338.
Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 673.
D.MT., 129 So. 3d at 338 (noting "the biological connection between mother and

daughter is not in dispute").

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 347.
Id.
In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 966-67 (Fla. 1995).
D.M T., 129 So. 3d at 337.
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 329.
In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995).
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biological mother was emotionally committed to the child."

Further, borrowing the analysis employed by the Janssen court, the
instant court found that the parties had intended to raise the child as a
unit.5 8 As such, when the relationship fell apart, the birth mother had no
right to take the child away.5 9 The instant court explained that, as is far
too often the case in custody proceedings, one parent cannot deprive the
other parent of his or her parental rights simply because the relationship
between the parents does not work out.6 0 The biological mother's actions
show she did not intend to be merely an egg donor.6 ' She intended to be
a parent. 6 2 As such, the instant court opined that the informed consent did
not waive her parental rights.6 3 Application of section 742.14 thus
violated her constitutionally protected parental right.64
The instant court chose to analogize the facts of the instant case to the
situation involving unwed fathers' inchoate interest to their children.6 5
Historically, courts have treated unwed mothers and unwed fathers
differently by automatically recognizing an unwed mother's interest in
her children, but failing to recognize an unwed father's interest in his
children until he shows acceptance of parental responsibilities.6 6 The
instant court grouped biological mothers into the unwed fathers group
and birth mothers into the unwed mothers group.6 7 Thus, the instant court
treats differently an unwed biological mother in a lesbian relationship and
an unwed biological mother in a heterosexual relationship. 8
Next to the biological relationship between mother and child, the
instant court regarded the intent of the parties as the foundation for
protected constitutional rights. 6 9 By placing so much emphasis on the
intent of the parties, the instant court effectively disregards signed
agreements purporting to waive the biological mother's rights to any
resulting children conceived via assisted reproductive technologies. 7 0
Thus, the instant court leaves open the possibility that this argument could
57. D.M T., 129 So. 3d at 329.
58. Id. at 330.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 329.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 347. The reproductive doctor also testified that the couple insisted to
him that any
waiver of rights language in the consent forms would be inapplicable to their situation,
because
they intended to raise the child together with the biological mother providing the
egg and the birth
mother having the baby. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 337.
66. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 966-67 (Fla. 1995).
67. D.M T., 129 So. 3d at 339.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70.

Id. at 345.
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be used in other cases where the waiver is applicable and holds more
value to the set of facts, such as in cases of surrogacy. Moreover, the
instant court invites retroactive arguments regarding these types of
waivers. That is, a woman who donates her egg to her partner with the
express intent that her partner alone raises the child may be able to argue
the contrary years later. Thus to protect the interests and true intentions
of all parties, standard informed consent forms, just as with related laws,
must change with the times and reflect societal progress.
may manifest
Moreover, establishing a parental interest via intent
7 1The instant court
proceedings.
itself in the like of complicated custody
contends that animosity towards one's partner is no reason to deprive that
72
partner of his or her right to be a parent. However, the use of intent to
establish parental rights may invite former partners to do what the instant
that the birth mother
court warns against. The dissent argues, for example,
7
denied the parties intended to co-parent the child. ' Thus, two sides exist
where intent is the determinative factor.
To overcome this limitation of the intent test, the dissent relies on the
executed waiver.7 4 That is, the dissent holds application of section 742.14
did not deprive the biological mother of her rights because she waived
75
them when she signed the informed consent. Hence, while the majority
contends that the biological relationship and intent of the parents are the
the dissent
most important factors in establishing a parental right,
76
maintains that signed agreements dictate parental rights.
Finally, the implication of the instant court declaring the statute as7
applied unconstitutional as a violation of due process is that the right to
be a parent to one's biological child conceived using assisted
reproductive technologies cannot be denied to anyone. Had the statute
only been declared unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection,
the right could have still been denied to the biological mother in the
instant case and others like her. That is, the fundamental right could be
71. d. at 330.
72. Id
73. Id. at 348 (Polston, C.J., dissenting). The birth mother "did not concede that at the time
of .. . egg donation the two had intended to co-parent any resulting child. In fact, her answer
expressly denied that allegation." Id.
74. Id. at 350-51.
75. Id. at 358.
76. Compare id at 347 (majority opinion), with id. at 358 (Polston, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 347 (majority opinion). As the biological and intended parent, the biological
mother had a fundamental right to parent her child. Id Application of section 742.14 deprived her
of this fundamental right and thus violated her due process. Id
78. The instant court also held that section 742.14 was unconstitutional as a violation of
equal protection. Id. at 347. The court noted that an individual in a heterosexual relationship who
was equally situated to the biological mother in the instant case would not have been deprived his
or her parental rights. Id. at 344. Accordingly, the statute violated equal protection. Id
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denied as long as it was denied to everyone equally. A simple rewording
of the statute could effectively accomplish this. 79 A biological parent who
intends to parent his or her child and forms a parental relationship with
the child has a fundamental right to parent that child." Considering the
weight the instant court and other courts have placed on the biological
relationship between parent and child, a simple rewording of the statute
could have grave results.
In placing emphasis on the biological relationship and intent of a party
to be a parent, the instant court ignored the effect of signed agreements
in establishing protected parental interests. 8 ' The instant court instead
opined that a protected parental interest develops in a parent as long as he
or she has a biological relationship with the child and intends to parent
the child.82 Deprivation of such a right, by application of section 742.14
in the instant case, thus violates the parent's due process.8 3 While the
public policy implications in the instant case necessitated such a finding,
the instant court has affirmed a framework that may be unsound in other
cases.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2014).
D.M T, 129 So. 3d at 347.
Id.
Id
Id
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